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Summary 
Ultra-hazardous risky activities as nuclear industry cannot be considered as “normal 
industries” i.e. industries without abnormal environmental and health risks. Consequently, 
the industrial organization of these specific sectors is of the utmost importance. This paper 
aims at studying this question. We focus on the associated costs of prevention and civil 
liability. We analyze how civil liability rules may contribute to extend or to discourage the 
expansion of nuclear parks to new operators. The paper compares the consequences of 
extending the management of nuclear stations to several independent operators. This 
question can apply to the unification process of the European electricity market in which 
several public and private nuclear power operators are running. The paper shows that the 
choice between either a monopolistic scheme (one operator managing  several plants) or a 
decentralized one (one operator by station) depends on the condition of application of the 
legal civil liability regime and on the strength of the safety control exerted by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Authorities. It is shown that when the control is high, then the safety costs 
generated by the monopolistic organization are less than the same costs of a decentralized 
one. However, conditions on the insurance policy can mitigate this result. 
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0.  Introduction 
From the end of the 20
th Century to the beginning of the 21
th one, nuclear power 
industry developed fast because of the regular price crisis that oil and gas energies suffered 
during this period. Nuclear energy has been seen as a powerful and efficient complement or 
partial substitute to them. However, this growth has been interrupted due both to the 1979 
Three  Miles  Island
1  accident and the 1986 Tchernobyl catastrophe that froze the nuclear 
impetus for long. At the beginning of the 2000 years, new oil and gas crisis and the new 
environmental concerns about  GHG  emissions  and their mandatory reduction
2  helped the 
revival of the nuclear industry
3. This state of matter could be considered as true until 11
th 
March  2011  before  that  the  9.0-magnitude  Tohoku  earthquake  and  its  following  tsunami 
devastated Japanese northeast coast. The subsequent catastrophic consequence has been the 
knocking out of the reactor cooling systems of the Fukushima Daiichi and Daini electro-
nuclear plant. This induced leakage of irradiated contaminant that threats populations located 
in the plant’s vicinity, the supply of fresh water, the sea resources and the agriculture products 
on a large scale in Japan. 
As for the Three Miles Island
4 and Tchernobyl accidents, by its severity, the  Fukushima 
disaster  undermines  (and will undermine)  the defenders’  position  of  the  nuclear  option. 
Already, in Europe, some countries put into question their recent nuclear power programs as 
Germany and Italy for instance. Anyway, the industrial and economic consequences of this 
catastrophic  event  are  still  unknown  because  at  the  present  time  (April  2011)  Japanese 
authorities are far from getting control on the situation: the Fukushima catastrophe is still 
going on and developing. Consequently, these events will spark a close questioning of the 
viability and the safety of the whole nuclear plants in the World. Without doubt, after that, 
some stations will be closed or refurbished.  
However, from an economic viewpoint, the present situation could be quite different from 
what the past showed. Indeed, in the eighties, nuclear accidents entailed either the break down 
or the serious slow down of the electro-nuclear projects in most Countries. By now, emergent 
countries are deeply involved in the development of their energy plan and going back to a 
fossil  energy  alternative  could  be  difficult  for  them.  Hence,  in  spite  of  the  Fukushima 
accident, nuclear program will go on spreading, even at slower rates.   
                                                           
1 Rogovin and Frampton, (1980). 
2See e.g. the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment Report, (2007). 
3 So for example the Ampere(2000) report. 
4 Rogovin and Frampton, (1980). 3 
 
This  structural  trend  and  this  tragic  accident  put  spotlights  on  the  very  sensitive 
question of the electro-nuclear plants safety. Even if nuclear catastrophes are deemed to occur 
with  very  low  probability
5,  they  have  far-reaching  consequences  for  health  and  the 
Environment. Furthermore, the very recent history has shown that unexpected scenarios can 
develop as in Fukushima where the tsunami damaged simultaneously its four reactors.   
As a consequence, giving up the nuclear sector is a long run project and more pr obably, 
nuclear programs will last several more decades. Then, it is natural and legitimate to consider 
that, nowadays, the industrial organization of this ultra-hazardous risky industry is becoming 
a major stake
6. Initially, Governments boosted the development of electro-nuclear industry in 
the wake of the development of military activities . However at the present, private interests 
are growingly interested and involved in the development of nuclear programs. This can take 
the shape of public-private participation. For instance, in the United States from July 1999 to 
September 2008, eighteen US nuclear plants changed ownership
7. The firm  Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO) in Japan is private and manages three nuclear plants. Private firms 
are  all  the  more   encouraged  to  invest  in  this  sector  by  the   international  institutional 
improvement of the coverage conditions  of third party damages. The temptations to break 
State monopolies in this sector are great. Furthermore, the unification of the electricity market 
(as it is the case in Europe) induces several nuclear operators to live together. Taking int o 
account these factors leads to wonder whether a greater safety is guaranteed by a centralized 
organization of the nuclear sector, or whether the arrival of  new comers can contribute to 
increase the level of care and protection under a decentralization process. Since the end of the 
nineties this point is controversial, (see for instance  Varley and Paffenbarger (1998), or still 
AEN-OCDE (2000)). The recent Jap anese catastrophe reopens this debate following the 
Italian and German decisions. 
                                                           
5 “It is sometimes argued that for, so-called” Damocles risks”, i.e. risks with a very high damage and a low 
probability, the risk assessment of the public is not proportional to the risk. The occurrence of a very high 
damage should be avoided, even if the costs for the avoidance are much higher than the expectation value of the 
damage. However past attempts to quantify this effect have not been successful or accepted, so there is currently 
no accepted method on how to include risk aversion in such an analysis. Consequently it is currently not taken 
into account within the ExternE methodology. Research on how to assess this, for example with participatory 
approaches, is clearly needed.”, Bickel and Rainer (2005), p. 226 
6 See for instance protests against the building of a new nuclear power station in Armenia at Metzamor who sits 
in a seismic zone that has suffered one of the worst earthquakes in modern history.  
http://www.nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/Environmentalists_decry_risks_of_new_Armenia_nuclear_reactor_9
99.html. 




This  paper  assesses  on  a  theoretical  basis  how  civil  liability  rules  influence  the 
entrance of new operators on the electronuclear production. This is done by appraising the 
consequences on care levels of the splitting-up of an electro-nuclear park into independent 
entities. Performance is evaluated by the level of safety and the global cost of liability and 
prevention. Choosing between centralizing and decentralizing the organization of a park of 
nuclear plants depends on several factors as, for instance, the nature of the legal civil liability 
regime, the strength of the control exerted by the Nuclear Regulatory Authorities and the 
nature of the insurance policy. When the control is low, we show that both structures are 
equivalent because of the similarity of their safety costs. However, under a high control, a 
centralized organization generates lesser safety costs compared to a decentralized structure 
though  this  opinion  should  be  moderated.  Indeed,  the  present  model  shows  that  a  high 
insurance cover may favor the decentralized organization. This may be done, for instance, by 
pooling the financial resources of different operators as in the US Price-Anderson Act of 
1957, or the German insurance system based on a large extension of the operators’ liability. 
This  question  has  policy  implications.  For  instance,  it  may  be  applied  to  the  unification 
process of the European electricity market characterized by several public and private nuclear 
operators
8.  
For this reason, compared to the wide field of the electro -nuclear economics, this 
paper will  deal neither with the economic benefits of nuclear energy compared to other 
energies (MIT (2003), (2009), Bickel and Rainer (2005)), nor with the operating conditions of 
the nuclear deal with price uncertainty (Gollier, Proult, Thais and Walgenwitz (2004), Linares 
and Conchado, (2009)), nor with the question of decommissioning plants, and, still, nor with 
the reprocessing of nuclear waste. Its argument borrows some features of the debate about 
civil liability in the electro-nuclear industry. Most of these controversial contributions (Dubin 
and Rothwell (1990), Heyes a nd Heyes, (1998), (2000a), 2000b), Faure and Borre (2008), 
Faure and Fiore (2009), Rothwell (2001)) show that putting ceiling on the level of repairs 
comes at subsidizing implicitly this industry
9 and tends to let unpaid the externality costs. 
However, this paper will not take this road. Starting from the civil liability question, it focuses 
rather on understanding the best economic organization scheme that insures the best safety 
level.  
                                                           
8 In October 1, 2010, in Europe, Russia and Ukraine included, there is a total of 195 nuclear power plant units 
with an installed electric net capacity of 170 GWe in operation in Europe 19 units with 16,9 GWe were under 
construction in six countries. (source European Nuclear Society). 
 http://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-power-plant-europe.htm 
9 See also the synthesis achieved by Carroll and Froggatt (2007). 5 
 
A first paragraph explains the nature of civil liability in the electro-nuclear sector. It 
underlines the importance of the ceiling of the level of repairs for inducing private operators 
to enter the market. A second paragraph describes the model based on the comparison of the 
expected costs of the organization of a park of two stations managed either by a unique 
operator or by two operators. A third one compares each kind of organization considering the 
level  of  effort  dedicated  to  safety.  A  fourth  one  concludes  and  gives  some  policy 
recommendation.  
1.  Civil liability and the development of the nuclear industry  
Before 1988, Soviet Union acceded neither to any nuclear conventions nor to national 
nuclear liability law and, after the Tchernobyl 1986 disaster, this Country escaped to the duty 
to compensate damages to health, crops of national and international economies. To avoid 
future  detrimental  situations,  the  international  community  amended  the  existing  nuclear 
conventions
10. The 1988 Joint Protocol linked together the  IAEA's Vienna Convention on 
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963 and the OECD's Paris Convention on Third Party 
Liability 1960. Protocols amending the Paris Convention and the Brussels Convention were 
signed on February 12, 2004.  
The joint protocol promotes a strict liability regime but maintains the liability limitation 
principle settled by the previous international convention s
11. These last one set on a global 
framework that national legislation can make more, but not less, stringent. Under the Joi nt 
Protocol, the operators of civil nuclear facilities are made strictly liable for damage resulting 
from nuclear incidents. Furthermore, there is an obligation of insurance or financial guarantee 
by the operator up to the fixed liability amounts in order to guarantee the availability of funds. 
This disposition is submitted to the approval of the Members States. What complicates things 
is that the States may have signed  one convention  but another one. This  contributes to 
differentiate the liability ceilings of the Members States. To put in a nutshell, we can quote 
the 2005 report Eurotom on the harmonization of nuclear civil liability rules in Europe. 
“In  sum,  the  protection  of  victims  of  nuclear  accidents,  the  obligations  of  nuclear 
operators, transporters, (re-)insurers and public authorities in the EU Member States are 
governed  by  a  patchwork  of  diverse  legal  regimes:  (i)  the  liability  of  some  operators  is 
unlimited, whereas others have a capped liability; (ii) the operators´ insurances differ both as 
                                                           
10 See for instance, Faure and Fiore (2009),  
11 Under the Joint protocol of 1988, the operator’s liability is absolute, i.e. the operator is held liable irrespective 
of fault, except for "acts of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection”, terrorism acts do not enter in the 
exclusion category.  6 
 
regards their coverage and payable fees; and (iii) the obligation to compensate victims of a 
nuclear accident differs both as regards the damages covered and the payable amounts.”  
Why do States choose the ceiling of redress rather than applying some “standard” strict 
civil liability regime? In fact, the hugeness of repairs due to nuclear hazards coupled with a 
civil strict liability regime prevents private firms to exert an activity in the nuclear field. 
Schwartz, (2006, p.39) summarizes the point very well: “With no protection against a liability 
that  was  potentially  unlimited  both  in  time  and  amount,  nuclear  plant  owners/operators, 
builders and suppliers were understandably hesitant to commit to the development of the 
industry.” 
Therefore, developing nuclear industry involves relieving nuclear operators of the burden 
of potentially ruinous liability claims
12. The governments ceiled the amount of compensation 
payable to victims by liable operators in the aim at avoiding judgment proofness. Under the 
evolution of international agreements, the   caps to liability may be subject to institutional 
changes and, generally, the tendency is to increase the level of the ceiling. For instance, under 
the Brussels Convention,  in France, the operator’s liability is limited to €91.5 million per 
nuclear accident in a facility and to €22.9 million per nuclear accident during transportation. 
The State in which the accident occurred will be liable for the compensation of victims up to a 
maximum of €228.6 million. Above this amount, the signatory’s members of the Brussels 
Convention  contribute  collectively  to  compensation  up  to  a  ceiling  of  €381.1  million. 
However, under the 2004 protocol, the availability of compensation amounts is much greater 
and covers a greater number of victims and collateral damages. Accordingly, the operator’s 
liability is around €700 million per nuclear accident and €80 million per nuclear accident 
during transportation. The responsible State of a nuclear damage will be liable for amounts 
above the €700 million up to a maximum amount of €1,200 million. Above this amount, the 
States that are a party to the Brussels Convention will be contribute to a maximum amount of 
€1,500 million.  
In the USA, the Price-Anderson Act of 1957 rules the civil liability for damages caused 
by  a  nuclear  accident.  Since  the  1988  amendments,  nuclear  power  plant  licensees  must 
purchase  the  maximum  amount  of  commercial  liability  insurance  available  in  the  private 
market at a reasonable price. This is currently $200 million per plant. In addition, all nuclear 
power plant licensees  must participate in  a joint-insurance pool.  In the case of a nuclear 
                                                           
12  More explicit still is The “Exposé des Motifs” for the 1960 Paris Convention that considers that “unlimited 
liability  could  easily  lead  to  the  ruin  of  the  operator  without  affording  any  substantial  contribution  to 
compensation for the damage caused” (Exposé des Motifs, Motif 45). 7 
 
accident whose costs exceed the first layer of private insurance coverage, each nuclear plant is 
obligated to make payments of up to $88 million to cover any additional costs up to about 
$9.3 billion at the present time. The compensation provision of both the first and the second 
layers of insurance are “no fault” and are not subject to civil liability litigation. The financial 
cap is fixed to $9.5 billion and beyond this limit there are no further financial obligations. 
2.  The Model 
We compare the cost structure dedicated to safety and civil liability of two electro-
nuclear power structures. The first one is centralized i.e. a unique operator (public or private) 
manages two perfectly similar nuclear plants. The centralized structure may be split up and 
the two plants will be managed by two distinct operators. Each of them will own and manage 
a unique plant. “Similar” plant means that each one belongs to the same generation. Putting it 
otherwise, each one is built on the same engineering structure and has the same production 
capacity
13. 
2.1 Notations and assumptions 
2.1.1  The operators 
The  considered  economy  comprises  two  similar  electro-nuclear  plants  indexed  by 
?,? = 1,2. The index M denotes the unique operator (sometimes called also the “monopolist”) 
and by no letter when ambiguity is impossible. When the independent operators manage them, 
the index will be they will be denoted by ?,? = 1,2 (operator ? manages one plant).  
Assumption 1: The operators are risk neutral. 
Assumption 2: Both plants are similar. 
We consider now the operators’ financial capacity for redress. This capacity tallies 
with the total available asset needed to repair the consequences of a major accident. First, let 
? be the total financial capacity of the centralized structure, and, second; let ?? be the one of 
the operator ?,? = 1,2. ? and ?? include two parts. For the monopoly this value is ? = ? + 𝑄, 
where ? is the monopolist’s assets dedicated to the redress and 𝑄 is the amount that insurance 
                                                           
13 For engineers our economic assumptions could appear quite unrealistic. For instance Lochbaum (2000) notes  
the over-simplifications usually made to deal with this question: i) The plants are operating within technical 
specifications and other regulatory requirements, ii) Plant design and construction are completely adequate, iii) 
Plant aging does not occur; that is, equipment fails at a constant rate, iv) The reactor pressure vessels never fail, 
iv) Plant workers make few serious mistakes, v) Risk is limited to reactor core damage. If this set of assumptions 




companies accept to cover. Symmetrically, let ?? = ?? + 𝑄 be the financial capacity of the 
individual operator ?,? = 1,2 , (where ?? is the wealth of ? due to repairs). 
Assumption 3: The civil liability for nuclear accident is ruled by a capped strict liability 
regime where ? is the amount of the legal compensation (liability cap). 
If  ? is the total damage  due to a severe harm, the institutional cap c is such that 
0 ≤ c ≤ D (with the polar cases, i) c ≡ 0, which is a no-liability regime as in the Ex-USSR 
situation and, ii) ? ≡ ?, the standard strict liability regime as in India until 2010). For most 
nuclear countries, 0 < ? < ?. Assumption 3 means that insurance companies will not cover 
fully the cap and 𝑄 < ?. The share 𝑄 is identical whatever the exploitation structure, this 
because the cap is fixed whatever the production structure. This involves that the operators’ 
own assets must be such that ?,?? = ? − 𝑄. Then, if ? < ? − 𝑄 or  ?? < ? − 𝑄, the operator 
runs the risk to go judgment-proof (Shavell, 1986).
 This situation is excluded from the field of 
the analysis simply because insurance companies will not insure the facility if the operators’ 
assets are insufficient. 
2.1.2  The states of nature 
The elementary states of nature are denoted as follows. Let, the events ? and ? be 
respectively A:“a major accident occurs in a nuclear plant” and B: “business as usual” or  
still  “no  accident”.  A  major  accident  induces  the  major  damage  ?.  Because  the  electro-
nuclear park is constituted of two plants, the set of potential events (accident ?, or no-accident 
?) may be described by the following sets: 
-  𝐻1 =  ?,? : Major accidents occurred on both plants 1 and 2, 
-  𝐻2 =  ?,? :  A major accident occurred on plant 1 but not on plant 2, 
-  𝐻3 =  ?,? : No accident occurred on plant 1, but a major one on plant 2, 
-  𝐻4 =  ?,? : No accident occurred on both plants 1 and 2. 
Then Ω∗ is the set of sample:  Ω∗ =  𝐻1,𝐻2,𝐻3,𝐻4  
The electro-nuclear park is controlled by a regulatory authority. This control can be 
strict (noted 𝑆), or sloppy ( 𝑆). A strict control is this set of necessary mitigation measures that 
the regulatory authority imposes to the operator to limit the occurrence of another catastrophic 
event after the occurrence of a major accident. The regulator has to induce the operator to take 
relevant safety means to avoid the duplication of an accident in the safe facility. In fact, after a 
major nuclear hazard, measures have to be taken to test out stations of same vintage. This 
matter of fact can be checked after the Fukushima accident. Indeed, everywhere in the World, 
national nuclear authorities are launching checking programs. Morgan Stanley (2006, p. 46) 9 
 
asserts  that  a  severe  accident  in  one  reactor  can  “lead  to  the  shutdown  of  the  facility  in 
question and, potentially, similar facilities that may be considered to present the same risks”. 
This matter of fact can lead to slow down or interrupt the production. Consequently, the risk 
of other similar failure is significantly reduced to zero. This is true for both the centralized 
operator  and  the  individual  ones.  The  effective  control  applies  for  plants  of  the  same 
generation in which identical defects may be suspected. Then, we can formulate the following 
assumption.  
Assumption 4: After the occurrence of an ultra-hazardous accident, when strong control  𝑆 is 
exerted, the remaining safe plant is either slowed down or stopped temporarily.  
We can add that the failure of a plant of a given generation means that the similar stations 
“do not meet the highest safety requirements and therefore pose safety risk must be identified and their 
safety  performance  must  be  raised  to  the  necessary  level.  This  task  is  primarily  a  national 
responsibility,  but  it  should  be  facilitated  through  assistance  measures  by  the  international 
community”, Milenin, Skokov and Supeno (1997).  
The costs of controls, the slowing down or the temporarily stop down of the activity of the 
plant generates costs. This is expressed by the following assumption. 
Assumption  5:  After  the  occurrence  of  a  major  event,  under  assumption  4,  the  cost  of 
stopping or slowing down the remaining plant is equal to ?, (? > ? > 0). 
The cost ? should not be interpreted as a cost for care but rather as an opportunity cost 
such as the cost of increasing the load factor in the safe plant and checking the management of 
safety. 
2.1.3  The probability distribution of a major accident 
Here,  identical  plants  allow  us  to  consider  that  they  share  the  same  probability 
distribution of major failure. Each state of nature occurs with a given probability
14. Hence, a 
major accident in a plant is reputed to occur with a probability 𝑝 ?  ∈ (0,1)  or still 𝑝. Let 
the probability of the event ? (“business as usual or no accident”), be 𝑝 ?  = 1 − 𝑝 ?  =
1 − 𝑝. In this industry the nature of the control, weak or sloppy, is common knowledge. 
                                                           
14 It is difficult to assign a probability to what is considered as a rare event. As pointed by Schneider (2007) 
external  and  internal  event  may  influence  the  probability  distribution  (external  events  are  external  flooding 
(Central of Blayes, France,  1999), Tsunami (Indian Ocean, 2004), external fires (Los Alamos 1996, 2000), 
tornado and Hurricanes (David Besse USA, 1998, Hurricane Andrex). Considering internal events, have to be 
understood the losses of coolant (Kozloduy, Bulgaria 2003), numerous turbine fires, and secondary cooling 
circuits. These events combine with human errors and violation of procedures. Hence, as such, the probability of 
the melting down of the core takes sense when considering the whole set of potential failure of the security 
system.  10 
 
Hence, there is  no uncertainty from the operators’ side about  the type  of control
15. Both 
situations are clearly identified.  
2.2 The costs structures: infra-comparison between strong and weak control 
The nature of control as defined in 2.1.2 impacts on the expected costs of the industry:  
-  After a major accident, the level of the cap has to be paid deducing the amount of 
the insurance coverage 𝑄: ? − 𝑄. Let 𝜇 the insurance premium 𝜇 this one is equal 
to 𝑝𝑄 = 𝜇, (Shavell (1985)).  
-  When a strong control is exerted then, in the case of accident, the safe plant has to 
stop  or  slow  down  its  activity  for  checking  and  this  incurs  some  costs  in 
compliance with assumption 5: 
Now, we dispose of all elements to define the cost structure of an individual operator. 
To make easier the exposition we begin by describing the cost structure of the facility owned 
by a unique operator.  
2.2.1  The cost structure of an individual operator 
We will examine successively both cases: the weak and the strong control. 
i)  Weak control 
Under a weak control, the regulatory authority does not induce the operator to reduce 
or to stop the activity level for some deep check after an accident and assumption 5 does not 
apply. As a consequence, the operator ?,? = 1,2 is not affected by the accident suffered by the 
other plant. He has only to pay the insurance premium 𝜇 whatever the state of nature. The 
entire situation may be described by the following table: 
                                                           
15 The question of the probability of a major accident will be considered on a larger scale than the usual question 
of the melting of the core of a reactor. Indeed, it is the accumulated fission products in a reactor that forms the 
potential of radiation hazard. The melt down of the core of the reactor induces a severe accident. Safety is to 
prevent the release of these radioactive products and fuel isotopes. Accidents that issue on massive rejection of 
such material and threat populations and natural resources are particularly rare events. Indeed, in Western plants, 
an airtight containment reinforced concrete building (1.2 to 2.4 meters) tends to limit the effect of a melting of 
the  nuclear  core.  Probabilistic  methods  (Probabilistic  Risk  Assessment)  are  used  since  the  midst  seventies 
(Murray, 2000). The object is to determine the probability of occurrence of an undesired event such “as core 
damage, breach of containment, or release of radioactivity, and to determine potential causes” Murray, (2000 
p.277). Considering internal relationships, a catastrophic event does not occur suddenly. It supposes a succession 
of failure and events trees show the probabilistic path from a current incident to the disastrous event. That 
justifies the use of Bayesian approaches (Chen and Chu (1995)). Studies in the midst of the nineties show that 
the probability of the melting of the core in Europe of the nuclear plant is quite variable and depends on the 
generation of the power plant. 
The ExternE study of 1995 considered a core meltdown probability of 10
-5. However, the probability of such an 
event  depends  on  the  nature  of  reactors  that  have  evolved  throughout  time  following  technical  progress. 
Lembrechts,  Slaper,  Pearce  and.  Howarth  (2000)  show  that  the  range  of  probability  of  core  meltdown  is 
comprised  between  10
-3  and  10
-6  according  the  reactor  generation.  For  instance,  they  report  the  studies 
concerning a study on two French reactors, a 900 MW Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and a 1300 MW PWR, 








Cost structure of a strictly controlled operator 
States of nature   Cost  Probabilities 
𝐻1 =  ?,?   ? +  𝜇 − 𝑄  𝑝2 
𝐻2 =  ?,?   ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 
𝐻3 =  ?,?   𝜇  𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 
𝐻4 =  ?,?   𝜇  (1 − 𝑝)2 
Sum    1 
Table 1 
 Hence, this situation is equivalent to be faced to only two states of nature because the 
plants are independent one from the other one and the sample set reduces to: 
Ωi =  A,B , ?,? = 1,2 
Thus,  for  the  event  B,  the  costs  incurred  includes  only  the  cost  of  the  insurance 
premium, 𝜇 plus the one of the disastrous event, A, (𝜇 +  ? − 𝑄 ). The expected costs ???(𝑆) 
,? = 1,2 , for the operator are then: 
??? 𝑆  = [𝑝2 + 𝑝 1 − 𝑝 ] ? +  𝜇 − 𝑄  + 𝜇[( 1 − 𝑝 2 + 𝑝 1 − 𝑝 ] 
= 𝑝 𝜇 +  ? − 𝑄   + (1 − 𝑝)𝜇,            [1] 
And, after the simplification (where 𝑝𝑄 = 𝜇): 
???  𝑆  = 𝑝?               [2] 
Consequently, under a weak control (𝑆), the expected cost of strict capped liability is 
equal to the expected cost of the accident proportionally to the cap ?. 
ii)  Strong control 
As mentioned above, after an accident on one plant, the remaining safe plant will be 
submitted to some strong costly control and/or breaks. These operations will incur a cost ? 
(following  assumptions  4  and  5).  Under  a  strong  control,  the  state  𝐻1 = (?,?)  becomes 
unrealistic  and  a  null  probability  is  associated  to  it.  This  explains  by  the  fact  that  the 
probability of a major accident is very weak, then, after the checking of the other plant, the 
probability  of  a  new  catastrophic  event  on  it  is  still  weaker.  The  states  𝐻2 =  ?,?   and 
  𝐻3 =  ?,?   which  are  not  symmetric  at  the  individual  level  deserves  some  attention. 
Consequently, if the operator undergoes the accident (event 𝐻2), he will have to pay  ? − 𝑄  
for repairs, while if his plant is safe, he will incur the opportunity cost ? only. The entire 
situation may be described by the following table 2: 12 
 
Cost structure of a strictly controlled operator 
States of nature   Cost  Probabilities 
𝐻1 =  ?,?   ? +  𝜇 − 𝑄  0 
𝐻2 =  ?,?   ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  𝑝 
𝐻3 =  ?,?   𝜇 + e  𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 
𝐻4 =  ?,?   𝜇  (1 − 𝑝)2 
Sum    1 
Table 2 
The expected costs for the operator,? ,? = 1,2 ,  ???(𝑆) are then: 
??? 𝑆  = 0  ? +  𝜇  + 𝑝 ? +  𝜇  + 𝑝 1 − 𝑝 (𝜇 + e)+𝜇(1 − 𝑝)2    [3] 
and, as previously by simplifying with 𝑝𝑄 = 𝜇, we get: 
??? 𝑆  = 𝑝 ? + ? −?𝑝2              [4] 
We can check that the expected costs of a strictly controlled structure are higher or 
equal to a weak one, indeed: 
??? 𝑆  ≥ ???  𝑆  ⇒ 𝑝 ? + ? −?𝑝2 ≥ 𝑝?,          [5] 
This is always true because after developing: 
? 1 − 𝑝  ≥ 0.               [6] 
We deduce then the following proposition: 
Proposition  1:  Under  the  assumptions  1  to  5,  a  unique  plant  managed  by  a  single 
operator incurs higher costs when it is strongly controlled rather than when the control is 
weak. 
(Proof simple arithmetic and discussion above). 
We can define now the cost structure for the monopolistic situation and compare then 
both industrial structures.  
2.2.2  The centralized structure 
The  distribution  of  probability  corresponding  to  each  kind  of  control  may  be 
summarized in the following tables considering that the insurance premium is 𝜇. As before, 
we will examine both cases: the weak and the strong control. 
 
i)  Weak control 
Under a weak control the centralized organization can go on producing energy after a 
major accident by using his safe plant. Hence, as previously, the plants are fully independent 
one relative to the other one. We can draw then the following table: 13 
 
 
Cost structure of a weakly controlled monopolistic operator 
States of nature   Cost  Probabilities 
𝐻1 =  ?,?   2? + 𝜇 − 2𝑄  𝑝2 
𝐻2 =  ?,?   ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 
𝐻3 =  ?,?   ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 
𝐻4 =  ?,?   𝜇  (1 − 𝑝)2 
Sum    1 
Table 3 
The expected costs for the monopolistic operator under a weak control are then: 
?? 𝑆  = (2? + 𝜇 − 2𝑄)𝑝2 + 2𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(? + 𝜇 − 𝑄) + 𝜇(1 − 𝑝)2 
?? 𝑆  = 2𝑝(? − 𝑄) + 𝜇              [7] 
The expected cost of liability is equal to the expected amount that the operator has to supply 
for repairs. This corresponds to the level of the cap minus the amount reimbursed by the 
insurance company plus the premium.  
ii)  Strong control 
Under the strong control, assumption 5 applies and the monopolistic operator has to 
slow down or stop the production of the safe plant. He will incur the opportunity cost ? but 
equally the cost of due repairs. Hence, the table of cost is reproduced in the following: 
 
Cost structure of a strongly controlled monopolistic operator 
States of nature   Cost  Explicit probabilities 
𝐻1 =  ?,?   2? + 𝜇 − 2𝑄  0 
𝐻2 =  ?,?   ? + e + 𝜇 − 𝑄  𝑝 
𝐻3 =  ?,?   ? + e + 𝜇 − 𝑄  𝑝(1 − 𝑝) 
𝐻4 =  ?,?   𝜇  (1 − 𝑝)2 
Sum    1 
Table 4 
The event 𝐻2 means that once an accident has occurred on one plant, the operator has 
to  stop  or  slow  down  immediately  the  activity  of  the  other  facility.  Then,  the  payoff  is 
? + e + 𝜇 − 𝑄, which occurs with a probability 𝑝. However, considering that a specific plant 
?,? = 1,2 works “well” with a probability  1 − 𝑝  does not prevent, that the other one can fail 
with a probability 𝑝. This explains the state of nature 𝐻3. This may be seen in the following 
decision tree. 14 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
A priori we do not know what plant among plant 1 and 2, will fail. Hence, because they are 
similar, we consider that Nature (N in the decision tree) chooses with an equal probability 
𝜋 = 1/2 what plant will suffer an accident. Rigorously, the expectation cost should write:   
?? 𝑆  = 𝜋  2? + 𝜇 − 2𝑄 0 + 𝑝 ? + ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  + 𝑝 1 − 𝑝  ? + ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  + 𝜇 1 − 𝑝 2  
+(1 − 𝜋)  2? + 𝜇 − 2𝑄 0 + 𝑝 ? + ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  + 𝑝 1 − 𝑝  ? + ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  + 𝜇 1 − 𝑝 2 [8] 
This writing is justified for plants presenting different risk level. This could be useful 
for the analysis of different  generations  for instance  where the older  generations  may be 
considered as riskier than the younger ones. Here, this is not the case under assumption 1 
(𝜋 =
1
2 . Then, the expectation costs function writes: 
?? 𝑆  =  2? + 𝜇 − 2𝑄 0 + 𝑝 ? + ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  + 𝑝 1 − 𝑝  ? + ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  + 𝜇 1 − 𝑝 2 = 
?? 𝑆  = 2𝑝(? + ? − 𝑄) − 𝑝2(? + ? − 𝑄) + 𝜇        [9] 
If we compare ?? 𝑆  and ?? 𝑆  we can see that the advantage of a “weak-control” 
practice under a monopolistic situation gives not as clear results as in the previous case. Thus, 
we study conditions for having: 
?? 𝑆  > ?? 𝑆  or  ?? 𝑆  ≤ ?? 𝑆 . 
Considering ?? 𝑆  > ?? 𝑆 , this means that: 
 2𝑝 ? − 𝑄  + 𝜇 > 2𝑝(? + ? − 𝑄) − 𝑝2(? + ? − 𝑄) + 𝜇  
Or, still after simplifying: 
𝑝 >
2?
 ?+?−𝑄            [10] 
(With ? + ? − 𝑄 > 0). 
Then, ?? 𝑆  > ?? 𝑆 , this is true if  ? − 𝑄  > ?. We can establish proposition 2: 
Proposition 2: Under assumption 1 to 5, the level of the opportunity costs is essential to 
determine  whether  a  strict  controlled  centralized  organization  generates  higher  expected 
costs than a decentralized structure.  Consequently: 
i)  If  𝑝 >
2?
 ?+?−𝑄   ,  then  a  weak  control  incurs  lesser  costs  than  a  centralized 
organization. 
ii)  If,  in  the  opposite,  𝑝 ≤
2?
 ?+?−𝑄 ,  the  centralized  organization  involves  smaller 
costs.  
The proof results from the above argument. 15 
 
 
2.3 Decentralized vs centralized organization 
This  section  studies  the  efficiency  of  both  types  of  organization.  This  consists  in 
comparing each costs structure according the nature of the control. This analysis borrows 
some  feature  to  the  instruments  of  the  contestable  market  theory  in  Baumol,  Panzar  and 
Willig  (1982)  because  we  refer  to  the  sub-additivity  of  costs.  However,  our  approach  is 
different because we refer here to expected costs and we do not examine the sustainability 
question, i.e. the possibility for potential entrants to compete on prices. The question we deal 
with  is  to  know  whether  it  is  more  costly  organizing  monopolistically  ultra-hazardous 
activities, or conversely, decentralizing it with independent operators. Here, the cost structure 
corresponds to the cost of civil liability.  
2.3.1  The case of weak control 
It is important to note that the insurance premium plays a fundamental role. Indeed, in 
what follows we shall study the conditions for which the expected cost of the decentralized 
structure is either higher or lesser than the monopolist one, i.e:   ???  𝑆  2
?=1 ≥ ?? 𝑆  
or the reverse.   ???  𝑆  2
?=1 < ?? 𝑆 . It is obvious that the value at which the insurer fixes 
the  level  of  the  premium  is  determinant  for  having  either  the  cost  of  monopolistic 
organization higher than the decentralized one or the reverse.  
Let us assume that:   ???  𝑆  2
?=1 < ? 𝑆 . In what follows we consider that the level of 
the insurance premium of the decentralized organization is given and is equal to 𝜇 = 𝑝𝑄. 
From the previous definition we deduce that :  ???  𝑆  2
?=1 = 2𝑝? and consequently: 
  ???  𝑆 
2
?=1
< ?? 𝑆  ⇒ 2𝑝? < 2𝑝(? − 𝑄) + 𝜇 
or, 
𝜇 >  2𝑝𝑄 = 2𝜇 
Then, the condition for the monopolist operator to meet a higher expected cost of accident 
than under a decentralized structure is that his premium insurance should be more costly than 
for the individual operators. Otherwise, if 𝜇 = 2𝜇, then, both organizations, monopoly or the 
decentralization one are equivalent. 
Proposition 3: Under a weak control, under assumptions 1 to 5, if insurance premiums 
are defined proportionally for each plant (𝑝𝑄 = 𝜇 for each individual operator and 𝜇 = 2𝑝𝑄, 
for the monopolist), then the monopolistic and the decentralized organizations generates the 
same expected costs:  
  ???  𝑆  2
?=1 = ?? 𝑆             [11] 16 
 
Proof comes from the previous argument. 
We have to note that this result is similar to the case in which insurance is not compulsory 
and may be set up at 𝜇 = 𝜇 = 0. Then, it is equivalent to exploit a ultra-hazardous risky park 
of  plants  under  a  monopolistic  organization  (unique  operator)  or  under  a  decentralized 
organization (two independent operators).  
2.3.2  The case of strong control 
We analyze now the cost structure of the decentralized structure highly controlled. As 
before, we consider: 
  ??? 𝑆  = 2
?=1 2(𝑝 ? + ? −?𝑝2)       [12] 
And we compare it with [9] and we determine the conditions for having: 
i)  Either   ??? 𝑆  ≥ ?? 𝑆  2
?=1 , or 
ii)     ??? 𝑆  < 2
?=1 ?? 𝑆 .  
Then, let us analyze the relationship   ??? 𝑆  < 2
?=1 ?? 𝑆 , this is equivalent to: 
2(𝑝 ? + ? −?𝑝2) < 2𝑝(? + ? − 𝑄) − 𝑝2(? + ? − 𝑄) + 𝜇 
After developing, this relationship is true if there is 𝜇 > 0, such that
16: 
𝜇 > 2𝜇 + 𝑝2 ? + ? − 𝑄  
Consequently, if the monopoly insurance premium is higher than the sum of the premium 
of the individual operators’ plus 𝑝2 ? + ? − 𝑄  (which is positive), then, it is only if the 
monopoly gets adverse insurance premium that the relationship: 
  ??? 𝑆  < 2
?=1 ?? 𝑆 , is verified. 
Putting it otherwise, it is only if the insurance premiums are detrimental for the monopoly 
compared to the decentralized facilities that the centralized organization incurs higher costs. 
This is sufficient to establish proposition 4: 
Proposition  4:  Under  strong  control  and  under  assumptions  1  to  5,  if  insurance 
premiums are defined proportionally for each plant (i.e. 𝑝𝑄 = 𝜇 for each individual operator 
and 𝜇 = 2𝑝𝑄, for the monopolist), then the monopolistic organization incurs lesser costs than 
the decentralized organization:  
  ??? 𝑆  < 2
?=1 ?? 𝑆             [13] 
With a monopolist insurance premium proportionally less than the one of the individual 
operators (i.e. 𝜇 ≤ 2𝜇), then the advantage of the centralized situation is obvious, but this is 
an “unnatural” position and this result is not in the spirit of this model.  
 
 
                                                           
16 Remember that 2𝑝𝑄 = 2𝜇 17 
 
3  Insurance and effort  
The above results are reached under the assumption that a major accident occurs under 
a once for all given probability. However, by increasing or decreasing the effort dedicated to 
improving safety, the operators may influence the level of risk and the operators may lower 
the accident probability by taking due care.  
To  deal  with  this  point  we  adopt  the  Shavell  (1986)’s  presentation.  Let  ?  be  the 
operator’s level of safety effort, ? ≥ 0. The probability of an accident modifies as ? varies, 
1 > 𝑝 ?  ≥ 0, 𝑝′(?) < 0 and 𝑝" ?  > 0. In the following, the analysis is restricted to the 
more realistic situation of a strong control.  
The counterpart to the purchase of liability insurance is that the insurance company 
demands the highest level of care to the operators. Because of the specificity of the electro-
nuclear production, it is not unrealistic to assume that asymmetric information between the 
operator and the insurance companies are almost impossible. Indeed, at all moment the level 
of safety can checked by the insurance company. The expected costs functions are modified, 
considering that the operators are risk neutral we represent the cost structure of a facility 
owned by a single operator by the following table: 
Cost structure, strict control, one facility and one operator 
States of nature   Cost  Explicit probabilities 
𝐻1 =  ?,?   ? +  𝜇 + ? − 𝑄  0 
𝐻2 =  ?,?   ? + 𝜇 + ? − 𝑄  𝑝(?) 
𝐻3 =  ?,?   𝜇 + e + x  𝑝(?)(1 − 𝑝(?)) 
𝐻4 =  ?,?   𝜇 + ?  (1 − 𝑝(?))2 
Sum    1 
Table 5 
And, the second one, the monopolistic cost structure: 
 
Cost structure of a strongly controlled monopolistic operator 
States of nature   Cost  Explicit probabilities 
𝐻1 =  ?,?   2? + ? + 𝜇 − 2𝑄  0 
𝐻2 =  ?,?   ? + ? + ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  𝑝(?) 
𝐻3 =  ?,?   ? + ? + ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄  𝑝(?)(1 − 𝑝(?)) 
𝐻4 =  ?,?   𝜇 + ?  (1 − 𝑝(?))2 
Sum    1 18 
 
Table 6 
We assume that the monopolist spends the same amount ? for care in for the whole park. 
From  each  one  we  draw  the  expected  cost  of  civil  liability.  Consequently,  for  the 
“decentralized” operator: 
??? ?  = 𝑝 ? (? + ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄) + 𝑝 ? (1 − 𝑝 ? )(𝜇 + ? + ?) + (𝜇 + ?)(1 − 𝑝 ? )
2= 
??? ?  = ? + 𝜇 + 𝑝(?)(? + ? − 𝑄) − ?𝑝(?)
2    [14] 
And for the monopolist operator: 
?? ?  = 𝑝 ?  ?+ ? + ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄 + 𝑝 ?  1 − 𝑝 ?   ? + ? + ? + 𝜇 − 𝑄 
+  𝜇 + ?  1 − 𝑝 ?  
2
= 
?? ?  =  ? + 𝜇 − (? − 𝑄)(−2+ 𝑝 ? )𝑝 ?         [15] 
We can check that these functions are convex. They decrease for low values of ? and 
increase as ? grows because 1 ≥ 𝑝 ?  ≥ 𝑝(?)
2 ≥ 0 and for high values of ?, 𝑝 ?  and 𝑝(?)2 
tend to 0. This element is important to determine what structure will give the highest level of 
safety. This can be done directly by considering that the level of the premium is identical for 
both organizations i.e. 𝜇 = 2𝜇 . To compare fairly between these structures, we assume that, 
under  the  decentralized  structure,  both  plants  are  gathered  but  keep  their  management 
autonomy.  
We study then two conjectures. Concerning the first one, the insurance premium is given 
and the operators have to adapt ? to it. Concerning the second one, while in the second one, 
the  insurance  policies  is  adapted  to  the  care  level  supplied  by  operators,  i.e;    𝜇(?) =
𝑝(?) 𝑄 𝑛, (for 𝑛 = 1,2).  
3.1 The insurance premium is given 
We can set up the following proposition: 
Proposition 5: Under assumptions 1 to 5, when civil liability is ruled by a capped liability 
regime, a monopolistic organization induces a higher level of care than a decentralized one in 
so  far  that  the  value  of  the  cap  is  such  that   ? − ? − 𝑄 > 0.  If  ??
∗  and  ?𝜑
∗,  represent 





We replace the expected costs functions respectively by  
? and  𝜑 such that: 
? ?  = ??? ?  = ? + 𝜇 + 𝑝(?)(? + ? − 𝑄) − ?𝑝 ? 2), ? = 1,2. 
For the decentralized structure, and: 
𝜑 ?  = ?? ?  =  ? + 2𝜇 − (? − 𝑄)(−2 + 𝑝 ? )𝑝 ?  19 
 
for the monopolist organization.  
We can check that 𝜑 ?  and ? ?  are related each other: 
𝜑 ?  = ? ?  + 𝜇 −  ? − ? − 𝑄  −1 + 𝑝 ?  𝑝(?) 
Then, considering that if  ??
∗ is  that level  of effort such that cancels  ?′ ??
∗  ≤ 0, with 
equality for ??
∗ > 0, then: 
𝜑′ ??






∗ is that optimal effort level which minimizes 𝜑 ?  it sufficient to 
show that 𝜑′ ??
∗  < 0. This means that the monopolist situation supplies a higher optimal 
level of effort than the decentralized situation and the reverse if ??
∗ ≥ ?𝜑
∗. Indeed, as 𝜑 ?  and 
? ?   are  increasing  functions,  if  𝜑′ ??
∗  < 0  when  ?′ ??
∗  = 0,  then  𝜑 ??
∗   has  not  yet 




Now, we examine the conditions for which: 
𝜑′ ??
∗  < 0 ⟹ 𝜑′ ??
∗  =  ? − ? − 𝑄  1 − 2𝑝 ?  𝑝′ ??
∗  < 0 
this expression is verified if 1 − 2𝑝 ?  > 0, this means that 1/2 > 𝑝 ? , this by knowing 
that   ? − ? − 𝑄  > 0  (the  cap  is  supposed  to  be  higher  than  the  cumulated  value  of  the 
opportunity cost and the level of the coverage) and 𝑝′ ??
∗  < 0 (assumption on the density of 
the probability distribution). This last condition is easily checked because 𝑝 ?  is very small. 
Nobody will take the risk to invest in the electro-power generation with a risk of major failure 
such that 
1
2 ≤ 𝑝 ? . Hence, 𝜑′ ??
∗  < 0, for 1/2 > 𝑝 ? . As a consequence, ?𝜑
∗ > ??
∗ and the 
proposition 5 is verified.  
3.2 Variable insurance premium according the level of care 
Now we consider the situation in which the insurance adapts its premium to the level of 
effort  of  the  agent:   𝜇(?) = 𝑄𝑝(?)  and  𝜇(?) = 2𝑄𝑝(?).  we  apply  the  same  argument  as 
previously. That means that the insurance premium depends on the level of effort achieved by 
the operators. We draw the following proposition: 
Proposition 6:  Under assumption 1 to 5, under a capped liability regime, and when the 
insurance premium is defined proportionally to the level of care ?, where 𝜇 = 𝑄𝑝(?) and 
𝜇 = 2𝑄𝑝(?),  then  the  monopolistic  organization  induces  a  higher  level  of  care  than  the 




∗,  are respectively the optimum 
effort level of the decentralized and the centralized organization.  
 
Proof: As previously, we define respectively the following functions𝜑 ?  and ? ?  as: 20 
 
-  𝜑 ?  =  𝑝(?)(? + ? + ? + 2𝑄𝑝(?) − 𝑄) + 𝑝(?)(1 − 𝑝(?))(? + ? + ? +
2𝑄𝑝(?) − 𝑄) + (2𝑄𝑝(?) + ?)(1 − 𝑝(?))2 
-  ? ?  =  𝑝(?)(? + ? + 𝑄𝑝(?) − 𝑄) + 𝑝(?)(1 − 𝑝(?))(𝑄 𝑝(?) + ? + ?) +
(𝑄 𝑝(?) + ?)(1 − 𝑝(?))2) 
As previously, we express 𝜑 ?  as a function of ? ?  : 
𝜑 ?  = ? ?  + ?𝑝(?) + ?𝑝(?) − ?𝑝(?)2 + 𝑄𝑝(?)2  
and we seek for the first derivative function: 
𝜑′ ?  = ?′ ?  + ?𝑝′(?) + ?𝑝′(?) − 2?𝑝(?)𝑝′(?) + 2𝑄𝑝(?)𝑝′(?) 
As before we calculate 𝜑′ ??
∗  with ??
∗ such that ?′ ??
∗  = 0: 
  𝜑′ ??
∗  = 0 +  ? + ? − 2 ? − 𝑄 𝑝(??
∗) 𝑝′(??
∗) 
It  can  be  shown  that  this  value  is  negative.  Indeed,  𝑝′(??
∗) < 0,  and     ? + ?) −
2 ? − 𝑄 𝑝(??
∗)  is positive. To see that, let us note that 𝑝(??
∗) is always positive or null, 
hence we have to define, the conditions for which: 
? + ? > 2 ? − 𝑄 𝑝(??
∗) ⟹
? + ?
2 ? − 𝑄 
> 𝑝(??
∗) 
This  condition  is  always  verified because  ? > 𝑄,and ?,? > 0, the insurance company 
cannot allocate more than the cap. Consequently, 𝜑′ ??
∗  < 0, and 𝜑 ?  has not reached its 
minimum, at ??
∗  then  ??
∗ < ?𝜑
∗. The centralized structure ensures a higher level of safety 
compared to the decentralized organization.  
Remark : The insurance premium question: The previous results have been reached 
without specific assumptions on the level of the insurance premium. More precisely, it has 
been assumed that the level of insurance is identical whatever the competitive structure. This 
subject is becoming highly sensitive between authors who think that the level of insurance 
premium is considerably too high, taking account of the level of effective coverage (Faure and 
Fiore  (2008))  and  authors  who  consider  that  this  premium  is  too  low  because  of  an 
insufficient level of exposure from the insurance company side (Caroll, and Froggart, (2007)). 
Implicitly, we have admitted that the premium is equal to 𝜇 = 𝑝 𝑄 𝑛, where  𝑛 is the number 
of station as in Faure-Fiore (2009). However, we are not led to bring some judgment about the 
actual level of insurance premium of real companies. Indeed, our analysis considers only that 
under  similar  and  proportional  insurance  premium  the  cost  of  safety  is  lesser  under  a 
centralized  system  than  under  a  decentralized  one.  Our  results  are  depending  on  the 
relationships  between  the  amount  of  ? ,? and 𝑄.  Two  of  these  values  are  depending  on 
decisions of the Authorities, the amount of the ceiling ? and on the combined choices of the 21 
 
insurance market and the insurance corporations i.e. the level of 𝑄. Hence, if the lag between 
? and 𝑄 is sufficiently thin such that ? − ? − 𝑄 < 0 then 𝜑′ ??
∗  > 0 and with the same 
argument than above, ?𝜑 < ??, i.e. the decentralized structure insures a better safety. This 
point is important. Indeed, it means either that the insurance companies accept to increase 
their share in compensation or that the level of the ceiling is diminishing. We recall that this 
level may be such that 0 ≤ ? ≤ ?. Hence, the lesser the level of the cap, the larger is the road 
for a decentralized organization. However, as seen in the first paragraph (see also Caroll, and 
Froggart, (2007)), the landslide tendency is to increase the level of caps.  
The question of the negative value of  (? − 𝑄) − ?, however, has to be considered 
seriously. Indeed, it corresponds to the increased resort to private insurance due to the pooling 
of insurers as Pelzer (2007, p.55) shows it by underlining the US and the German experiences. 
We can quote it: “The operators’ pooling systems established in Germany and in the US 
prove their capacity to deploy many times the amounts required under the revised nuclear 
liability conventions and in particular the amounts offered by the insurance industry. The 
money will be provided to cover the legal liability of the operator liable without excluding 
certain risks from coverage”. 
Consequently,  when  the  lag  between  ?  and  𝑄  diminishes  (for  ?  given),  then  the 
decentralized structure may become more efficient than the centralized one.  
 
4.  Conclusion and Policy recommendations 
 
The public authorities aim at insuring the best safety coverage of populations against 
the risks of the electro-nuclear industry. The present paper has been limited at assessing the 
cost of safety only, letting aside the working costs of this industry. We show that a natural 
monopoly organization generates higher costs of care level than a decentralized management. 
This involves inducing dispersed operators to cluster them together. It is then the interest of 
the new structure to minimize its expected global safety and damage costs. This is done by 
increasing  the  level  of  safety  expenses  (proposition  6).  As  a  corollary,  the  condition  for 
increased safety is a high level of control from the regulatory authority side. Hence, the more 
stringent  are  becoming  the  Regulatory  Authority,  the  more  they  favor  scale  economies 
(proposition 4). The above results are independent of a privatization concern because in the 
nuclear sector, many ways can be invoked to privatize the production park. For instance, the 
stations can be privatized as separate entities, which may not be a viable competitive scheme. 22 
 
The safer scheme is then to consider that privatization may be achieved through the transfer of 
shares of a unique portfolio to different partners. Hence, this analysis has specifically focused 
on the question of the advantages of splitting the exploitation of a nuclear park independently 
of the question of privatization of assets.   
If it is impossible to maintain a centralized structure, then a decentralized organization 
should  be  accompanied  by  deep  changes  in  the  insurance  infrastructure.  Indeed,  this  one 
should favor an increase of the involvement of insurances and re-insurance companies. This is 
shown in the final remark of section 3. This result joins the contemporaneous trend that tends 
to extend the cover by insurance companies in this ultra-hazardous sector.  
These proposals could bring some confusion without more explanation. Indeed, the 
previous results do not mean that considering concrete present situations, the safety level of 
decentralized structures shows inefficiencies in so far that they comply perfectly with the 
actual norms of the regulatory authorities. Precisely, our argument means that if, for instance, 
safety standards have to increase, then as a consequence, they require more care effort (this 
lead to diminish theoretically the probability of an accident) whereas safety costs are near the 
equilibrium  level  ??
∗.  Then  the  centralized  monopolistic  organization  generates  lower 
equilibrium costs compared to a decentralized one.  
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